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Abstract. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) 
Regulations 2001 expanded the scope of embryo research in the UK. The 
documents produced by the advisory bodies involved with the preparation and 
review of these Regulations, namely the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert 
Group and the House of Lords’ Select Committee, present various arguments 
in support of embryo research. The first part of this paper scrutinizes the 
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proposed argument from probability. This first argument from probability is 
summarised as the view that early embryos are like lottery tickets. Like lottery 
tickets that have relatively little value before the draw because of the low 
probability of being the winning ticket, the value of early embryos would be 
relatively low because of the presumed low probability that they mature into 
more developed embryos. I argue that the argument is flawed. The second part 
of this paper examines these advisory bodies’ contention that the claim that 
embryo destruction can be the lesser evil is incompatible with the view that 
embryos have full moral status. Julian Savulescu has challenged this position 
by arguing that early embryos should be entered into a lottery in which they 
are subjected to the probability of being destroyed. While I challenge this 
second argument from probability, I argue that Savulescu is right that the 
claim that the embryo has full moral status is not incompatible with qualified 
support for embryo destruction, and that a revised version of Judith 
Thomson’s argument from the famous violinist justifies this conclusion. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 2001, the UK heralded a new era for embryo research by passing 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 
2001, adding new purposes of embryo research to those allowed under the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.[1] [2] Thus, it became the 
first State to approve of embryonic stem cell research, including ‘therapeutic 
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cloning’, or the creation of embryos by somatic cell nuclear transfer for 
research purposes aimed at finding therapies. This legal change revived 
controversy over the status of the embryo.  
Two advisory bodies have been closely involved with the UK legal 
change, namely the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group (charged by the UK 
Government with assessing the anticipated benefits, risks, and alternatives of 
new areas of research using embryos) and the House of Lords’ Select 
Committee (appointed to consider and report on the issues connected with 
stem cell research and human cloning arising from the new regulations). Their 
reports offer a number of arguments in support of the claim that early embryos 
lack the equal, full moral status – henceforth, simply referred to as ‘moral 
status’ – that many people consider should be granted to all born human 
beings.[3] [4] [5] In the first part of this paper I address the argument that this 
follows from the position which can be summarised as follows: early embryos 
are like lottery tickets (the first argument from probability). I question the 
validity of this argument. In the second part of this paper I examine if these 
advisory bodies are right to suggest that the view that the embryo has moral 
status is incompatible with embryo destruction. This claim has been contested 
by Julian Savulescu, who argues that, even if the assumption is made that 
early embryos have moral status, they should nevertheless be entered into a 
lottery in which some are selected randomly to be sacrificed for the benefits of 
others.[6] Each embryo would have a probability of being sacrificed for 
research purposes. I challenge this second argument from probability, and then 
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examine Judith Thomson’s analogy of the famous violinist, developed in the 
context of a discussion of abortion.[7] I argue that a revised version of 
Thomson’s analogy undermines the claim that a position of limited support for 
embryo destruction is incompatible with the view that the embryo has moral 
status.  
 
ARE EARLY EMBRYOS LIKE LOTTERY TICKETS (THE FIRST 
ARGUMENT FROM PROBABILITY)? 
 
Like lottery tickets that only have a small probability of becoming valuable 
after the draw, the relatively low value of early embryos is sometimes 
perceived as being determined by the view that the probability that they will 
survive beyond a certain critical stage or stages, for example successful 
implantation or gastrulation, is small. 
Even though an explicit account of this argument from probability is 
absent from the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group Report, this argument 
may underlie the claim that the early embryo is ‘a potential human being’.[8] 
While the Committee’s reasoning underlying this claim is by no means clear, 
it is clear that the Committee’s aim is to reject the view that the early embryo 
is a human being with moral status, rather than that the early embryo is a 
human being, as the Committee recognises that the early embryo is a 
‘developing human life’.[9] A plausible interpretation for why this claim is 
made is that the relatively high death rate of early embryos counts against 
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assigning moral status to them. While the Committee may adopt a ‘middle 
ground’ position or the view that ‘the respect due to the embryo increases as it 
develops’ at least partly because of the view that the embryo obtains more 
valued properties throughout his or her development, or actualises more 
potentialities, my focus here is on an alternative or additional interpretation of 
this text: the suggestion that what increases the embryo’s value is the sheer 
fact of the embryo overcoming more developmental hurdles towards reaching 
the valued end state of birth, that is, the rising probability of a successful 
outcome.[10] [11] The same view may underlie the House of Lords’ Select 
Committee’s contention that the following information is ‘consistent with’ its 
‘gradualist view’ (the view that the embryo’s value increases gradually): 
‘Although would-be parents may feel sad at the natural loss of early embryos 
before implantation, there is no public mourning ritual associated with it, nor 
is there for the loss of surplus embryos left over from IVF treatment’.[12] In 
one of the preceding paragraphs, this natural loss rate is estimated to be ‘as 
high as 75 per cent’.[13] My focus here is not on whether the absence of a 
public mourning ritual is relevant for determining the embryo’s value, but on 
whether the view that there is a high probability that early embryos may decay 
naturally, if true, justifies the view that they lack moral status or the view that 
the ‘natural loss’ of embryos is morally equivalent with the ‘loss’ of embryos 
through intentional destruction.[14] A positive answer to this question is 
suggested by the text quoted here, and was also given in a public lecture by 
Richard Harries, the Committee’s Chairman.[15] 
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One problem with this argument is that it aggregates the survival odds 
of each individual embryo. If it is the case that 75 percent of early embryos die 
before birth, this still does not establish that every early embryo has only a 25 
percent chance of surviving. Some early embryos may have only a 2 percent 
chance, and others a 90 percent chance. If the argument from probability is 
valid, these advisory groups should argue that some early embryos (those with 
a 90 percent chance) are more valuable than others (those with a smaller 
chance of surviving), rather than that all early embryos lack moral status 
because of their averaged survival chance. But should we really assign a 
different value to some early embryos simply because they have a smaller 
chance of surviving up to a certain stage compared to other early embryos? By 
analogy, one could argue that this justifies assigning a lower value to a child 
that is unlikely to live for more than five years compared to a child that has a 
high chance of reaching adulthood. Most, if not all people would find this 
unacceptable, holding instead that they have equal value (without implying, 
however, that they must also be treated in the same way). What is equally 
problematic, is the view that all early embryos have a lower value compared to 
some more developed humans simply because of the view that early embryos 
are more likely to die soon. The following analogies show that the argument is 
flawed. In some places, the mortality rate of children is high, yet it does not 
justify killing them. The probability that I die tomorrow may be high, yet I 
suspect (and hope) the reader agrees that this does not give you a licence to 
kill me. If the fact that I may die tomorrow does not justify you killing me 
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today, then it is not clear why the killing of embryos should be allowed simply 
because they may die before, for example, implanting or being born. One 
could counter that, for example, in the context of embryo selection following 
IVF, the word ‘killing’ does not apply as - in the words of Walton of Detchant 
(the person who proposed to the UK Government to set up the aforementioned 
Select Committee) - ‘those carrying abnormal genes will simply be allowed to 
degenerate naturally, as indeed many do during the process of normal 
conception’.[16] [17]. A similar aim may underlie the House of Lord’s 
Committee’s choice of words where it uses the words ‘the loss of surplus 
embryos’ in the context of writing about the lack of ‘public mourning ritual’ 
related to the ‘natural loss of early embryos’.[18] The aim is to present the 
intentional destruction of early embryos as a natural event (i.e. an event not 
caused by human agency), presumably because there is an implicit 
understanding that the words ‘natural loss’ sound more acceptable than the 
word ‘destruction’ or ‘killing’. The conceptual shift from ‘killing’ to ‘loss’ or 
‘natural degeneration’ is fuelled by the view that many early embryos die 
naturally anyway. The problem with this way of reasoning is that we all die 
naturally, yet that it does not justify killing. Therefore, it is not clear why the 
‘loss’ of IVF embryos resulting from deliberate destruction should be morally 
equivalent with the ‘natural loss’ of embryos during pregnancy. If Walton of 
Detchant’s reasoning is valid, the implication is that, when nutrients and an 
environment conducive for the maintenance of life are withheld from any 
newborn child with ‘abnormal genes’, this could also be called allowing them 
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‘to degenerate naturally’. While I do not dispute that sometimes it may be 
right to withhold or withdraw treatment for the benefit of the child, 
withholding care simply because the child may die soon because of its 
‘abnormal genes’ is unacceptable. Apart from the fact that the problematic 
nature of the concept ‘abnormal genes’ is ignored, the argument that humans 
with abnormal genes are less valuable compared to humans with normal genes 
simply because of their reduced chances of surviving beyond a certain stage is 
flawed. Compare the following scenarios. If the assumptions are made that a 
child with Down’s Syndrome has abnormal genes, and that I had such a child, 
I might be justified in allowing my child to degenerate once he is terminally ill 
and his systems begin to fail beyond the hope of recovery. However, if I 
choose to allow my healthy child with Down’s Syndrome to degenerate by 
denying him access to food through locking him out of the kitchen, the word 
‘killing’ is more appropriate than the words ‘allowing to degenerate’, and 
killing under these circumstances is clearly not justified. No argument is 
presented for why ‘allowing’ embryos ‘to degenerate’ should have more in 
common with the former than with the latter scenario.[19]  
To sum up: I have established that the first argument from probability 
fails as the claim, if true, that there is a high probability that early embryos 
will not survive to become more developed embryos or fetuses does not justify 
the conclusion that they lack moral status. While lottery tickets only have a 
probability of becoming valuable before the draw, there is no reason why the 
sheer probability that early embryos may not survive beyond a certain point 
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should affect their value. I conclude that killing early embryos is not 
justifiable on the basis of the view that early embryos may only have a low 
probability of surviving to become more developed embryos.  
 
SHOULD EARLY EMBRYOS BE ENTERED INTO A LOTTERY 
ANYWAY (THE SECOND ARGUMENT FROM PROBABILITY)? 
 
The Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group has claimed that the 
position of those who support the view that the early embryo has ‘full human 
status’ is necessarily incompatible with support for embryo research.[20] 
Similarly, the House of Lords’ Select Committee writes that ‘it is true that if 
an embryo had full human rights it would be inconsistent to do anything that 
had the effect of destroying it’.[21] The remainder of this paper will address 
the question if this position can be maintained. Julian Savulescu has contested 
this view by arguing that even if the assumption is made that the early embryo 
has moral status, this does not imply that killing early embryos can never be 
justified.[22] The negative value of killing such embryos might be outweighed 
by positive values which cannot be obtained without killing. The need for such 
a trade-off is also implicit in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2001 which stipulate that embryo research 
may be permitted for ‘developing treatments for serious disease’.[23] For 
research to be justified, the negative value of embryo destruction must be 
outweighed by the positive value of research. The relative importance of 
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research is correlated positively with the seriousness of the disease. Every 
research proposal must be assessed and expected to be the lesser evil 
compared to not carrying out the research project. Incidentally, this ‘balancing 
approach’ had already been endorsed by the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert 
Group and the House of Lords’ Select Committee, for example where the 
former expresses its support for embryo research if it ‘has the potential to lead 
to significant health benefits for others’ and if the use of embryos is ‘necessary 
to realise those benefits’.[24] [25] While both advisory groups agree that 
embryo destruction could simply be the lesser evil, the necessary price to pay 
for reaping the research benefits, they also claim that such a position is 
incompatible with attributing moral status to the embryo. 
Savulescu provides an interesting challenge to this position as he 
provides an elaborate account of how such a balancing approach could justify 
embryo destruction even if the assumption is made that the embryo has moral 
status. According to Savulescu, it could be ethical for embryos to be entered 
into what he calls the ‘Embryonic Stem Cell Lottery’. In this second argument 
from probability, the situation is as follows: if the overall chance of living for 
each of the embryos is increased in a world in which embryonic stem cell 
research is allowed, early embryos should be entered into a lottery in which 
there is a small probability of their being sacrificed for stem cell research. This 
view arises from his conviction that ‘it is not wrong to deliberately create 
embryos for research if that embryo is part of a larger class of embryos, and 
the benefits to that class of killing some outweigh the harms’.[26] Savulescu 
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puts forward a number of thought experiments to support this view. The most 
sophisticated one is the following. He imagines the explosion of a nuclear 
reactor, leaving his one year old child exposed to nuclear fall out. Numerous 
children develop leukemia, including his own. Bone marrow can now be 
generated most successfully by reprogramming brain cells, which are more 
resistant to radiation damage than bone marrow. Unfortunately, a whole brain 
must be destroyed. The extracted stem cells could be reprogrammed to treat 
ten children. Savulescu would enter his child with other children in a lottery to 
decide who should be killed to provide stem cells for others.[27] While a one 
in eleven chance of certain death seems preferable to a (presumably) one 
hundred percent chance of imminent death, the reason why the latter must be 
preferred relates to the fact that the former scenario involves intentional 
killing, which is unacceptable in these (as in most) circumstances. Savulescu 
disagrees, arguing that ‘it is ES cell research, like organ transplantation, that is 
respectful of human dignity in its reverence for the lives of the living’.[28] 
Savulescu’s reference to organ transplantation prompts me into making the 
following analogy. If the prospects for recipients of organ transplantations 
were such that, on average, they could live twenty years longer with the 
transplant than they would do without, Savulescu’s reasoning forces us into 
concluding that we should all enter into an ‘Organ Donor Lottery’ in which 
some of us would be sacrificed for organ donation (given the shortage of 
donor organs in many countries) with the understanding that organs will be 
available for all of us (except for those sacrificed) in case we should need 
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them in the future. After all, the net balance in terms of aggregate life years 
gained would be positive as at least seven organs per person sacrificed could 
be transplanted, leading to a total increase of life expectancy for those who are 
not sacrificed of one hundred and forty years. In this way, a great number of 
people who are dying now because of a shortage of organs could be saved. 
The problem is that I suspect very few of us would be willing to enter into 
such a lottery, holding instead that our lives should not be sacrificed for 
achieving the benefits of such a utilitarian calculus. 
I conclude that, if we cannot even voluntarily accept the probability of 
being sacrificed for others (for example, by entering into an ‘Organ Donor 
Lottery’), in spite of an overall increase in life expectancy, it is not coherent to 
subject children or embryos to the probability of being killed for others simply 
because their probabilities of survival would be compromised in a world 
wherein no children or embryos are being killed for the benefits of others. The 
question of whether or not a being has moral status or is a suitable candidate 
for destruction should not depend on that being’s relative chances of survival 
beyond a certain stage.  
 
ARE EARLY EMBRYOS IN SITUATIONS LIKE THOMSON’S 
VIOLINIST (THE ARGUMENT FROM THOMSON’S VIOLINIST)? 
 
Should we therefore conclude that the view that embryos have moral status is 
incompatible with support for some forms of embryo destruction? In a 
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different way from Savulescu’s, Judith Thomson has contested this view.[29] 
In the context of discussing abortion, Thomson developed the following 
analogy, to argue her case that some forms of killing are justifiable. She asks 
us to imagine waking up in a hospital and discovering tubes going from our 
bodies to the body of an unconscious person, a famous violinist, suffering 
from a potentially fatal kidney disease. We are told that we are the only 
individuals with the correct blood type and that we were kidnapped for this 
reason, so that our circulatory system could then be connected to that of the 
diseased person. In this way, our kidneys could clean the violinist’s blood. We 
are also told that the diseased person will die unless we remain connected for 
nine months. As Thomson believes that, in spite of the negative consequences 
that this may have, we are nevertheless entitled to disconnect ourselves, one 
could argue that pregnant women therefore also have, in some situations, the 
right to kill.[30] Thomson did not claim that all embryos are in situations like 
her violinist’s, but that some are. She suggested the need for a dividing line 
between circumstances when killing is acceptable and circumstances when it 
is not. She first considers embryos posing a threat to the mother’s life, which 
is compared with the scenario when the kidnapped person would die because 
of the strain on his kidneys. Thomson argues that killing is acceptable in these 
circumstances, but also in cases of contraceptive failure when ‘all reasonable 
precautions against having a child’ have been taken and when ‘assuming 
responsibility for it would require large sacrifices’.[31] 
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Thomson is right that killing embryos should be acceptable in 
situations when the continuation of pregnancy poses a serious risk to the life 
of the pregnant woman. The reason why this must be allowed is illustrated by 
the following analogy. We do not compel parents of children who need a 
kidney transplant to have a reasonable chance of avoiding imminent death to 
donate a kidney, even if they are a good tissue match, and even if the risk for 
the parents involved may be relatively small compared to the risk of 
continuing with an ectopic pregnancy. Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect 
mothers to bear the risks associated with situations like ectopic pregnancies. 
However, if we start from Thomson’s premise that embryos have moral status, 
she is wrong to suggest that the need to make ‘large sacrifices’ after 
contraceptive failure is a sufficient reason for embryo destruction. The reason 
why her ‘argument from the lesser evil because of the need to make large 
sacrifices after failed contraception’ is unacceptable, relates to the following 
disanalogies which are overlooked by Thomson. Firstly, while the person 
whose body is plugged into the violinist’s body has not been able to consent to 
being connected, a plausible view is that not all women who have sexual 
intercourse are coerced into having it. Secondly, while the kidnapped person’s 
consent to go to sleep did not include the consent to be kidnapped, many 
people who consent to sexual intercourse, even when it is not aimed at 
procreation, also consent to the possibility of conception. Indeed, a plausible 
view is that many people know that even the best contraceptives can fail. 
These disanalogies are morally relevant. Consider the following scenario. 
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Imagine that I became pregnant after consenting to intercourse not aimed at 
procreation, following contraceptive failure. My pregnancy were smooth and I 
did not experience the need to make ‘large sacrifices’. However, upon birth I 
would find my child to be severely handicapped. I might now want to kill my 
child because both I and others would have to make ‘large sacrifices’ to care 
for my child, for a period much longer than nine months. While nothing in 
Thomson’s argument would prevent me from doing so, I doubt if Thomson 
would find the killing of my child (presuming that it is not in his best interests) 
acceptable. If embryos have moral status, killing embryos is not acceptable for 
this reason either.   
For women who are coerced into intercourse, however, Thomson’s 
analogy is relevant. Their situation is sufficiently similar to the situation of 
someone who has been kidnapped and plugged into the body of her violinist. 
Moreover, supporting the existence of embryos thus conceived may prolong 
significantly the trauma caused by the immoral sexual act. Even if the 
assumption is made that embryos have moral status, their destruction is 
justified in such situations.[32] Francis Beckwith, however, has objected to 
this argument. He argues that, if raped women are allowed to abort, one must 
also allow sperm donors - whose sperm had been stolen and inseminated into 
women - to kill any resulting children, if they are forced to pay a large sum of 
money for child support by an unjust court.[33] Therefore, in his view, both 
abortion after rape and the killing of children in the ‘unjust court’ scenario 
should not be permitted. Beckwith’s analogy is flawed. The objection is that 
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unjust financial burdens do not carry the same weight as allowing and 
supporting the forced physical presence of an unborn human being. If 
Beckwith’s analogy with abortion after rape were valid, it would allow anyone 
with financial difficulties resulting from injustice, not just sperm donors, to 
kill their children if it were financially beneficial. However serious financial 
injustice is, the taking of a life cannot be the right way to resolve such 
situations. By contrast, taking the life of an embryo conceived after rape must 
be allowed as, like the kidnappers in Thomson’s scenario, rapists do not have 
the right to subject their victims to the possibility of being coerced into 
supporting the existence of a human being with their own body. To sum up, 
most embryos are not in situations like Thomson’s violinist’s, yet some are, 
and the killing of these embryos – even if the assumption is made that they 
have moral status – may be the lesser evil when the women who carry them 
have been coerced into having intercourse, or are at serious risk of losing their 
lives by continuing with the pregnancy.  
 I now address the question if these advisory bodies are also wrong to 
claim that the view that embryos have moral status is incompatible with 
embryo research. Having argued that the killing of an embryo is justifiable 
when the pregnant woman is at serious risk of losing her life if she continues 
with the pregnancy, for example in the case of an ectopic pregnancy, one 
could argue that embryos should also be legitimate candidates for destruction 
if embryonic material could be used to save other people who are at risk of 
losing their lives because of serious disease. However, there is a morally 
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relevant difference between sacrificing an embryo for the sake of those who 
might benefit from embryo research, and sacrificing an embryo to save the 
mother. The following analogy makes this clear. Many people agree that it can 
be morally right to kill out of self-defence, while agreeing also that killing is 
not acceptable to harvest organs which could save others. Since killing an 
embryo to save one’s life is an example of the former, it is permissible. Since 
killing for the sake of the benefits which may be derived from embryo 
research has more in common with the latter, it is incompatible with the view 
that the embryo has moral status. If the embryo has moral status, the current 
legal climate in the UK, and in many other countries, fails to protect those 
embryos who are not created after a coercive act and those who do not pose a 
serious risk to the life of the pregnant woman. If the premise is valid, legal 
provisions must be created to assess formally if those considering embryo 
destruction find themselves in situations that involve either ‘coercion’ or 
‘serious risk’, and research should be considered only on those embryos (who 
would, therefore, not be destroyed for the sake of research).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that the advisory bodies involved with the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001 have failed to 
establish that early embryos lack moral status by appealing to the first 
argument from probability. Early embryos are not like lottery tickets as their 
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value should not depend on the probability of a successful outcome. I have 
also argued, contrary to what these advisory bodies claim, that the view that 
the early embryo has moral status is compatible with a position of limited 
support for embryo destruction. While Savulescu rightly makes this point, I 
have shown that his option for a balancing approach - the second argument 
from probability discussed here - in which embryos are entered into a lottery 
in which some are destroyed for the benefits of others, is flawed. A revised 
interpretation of Judith Thomson’s analogy of the famous violinist was 
proposed to illustrate the point that embryo destruction can be the lesser evil 
even if the premise that the embryo has moral status is accepted. If the embryo 
has moral status, the current UK legislative framework (and legislation in 
many other countries) related to the destruction of early human life must be 
revised in the light of this interpretation.  
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